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"The evidence never lies," so the old adage states. However, persons who ana-
lyze and interpret the evidence may testify falsely about their qualifications or
their analyses, or they may negligently perform analyses or make errors in inter-
preting evidence. Consider three examples. In Wyoming, a man spent three years
in jail after being convicted of murdering his girlfriend.1 He won a new trial and
was acquitted after a forensic pathologist reexamined the case and determined that
the coroner's ruling that the death was a homicide and not a suicide was errone-
* Associate Professor of Law, Nova University; J.D. 1980 George Washington University; B.A. 1976 University
of Florida. The author thanks Professors Michael J. Dale and Shelby Greene and Goodwin Research Fellow
Marci Eisdorfer for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
I. See infra note 73 for information on the case.
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ous.2 In New York, investigative journalists exposed the false credentials of the
deputy director of a crime lab, who had testified many times as an expert serolo-
gist.' He was arrested on three felony perjury counts and ultimately pled guilty to
three misdemeanor counts and resigned from various professional organizations .'
In North Carolina, officials had to reexamine 159 criminal cases because local of-
ficials discovered fingerprint misidentifications.5 Two murder charges were
dropped after reevaluating the evidence.' Expert malpractice is a problem that
threatens the integrity of the justice system.
This article explores the issue of expert witness7 malpractice. The article dis-
cusses ways in which the legal and scientific communities have responded to the
problems of expert witness malfeasance. The article concludes with the assertion
that expert witnesses owe their clients certain duties based upon their professional
2. See id.
3. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
4. See id.
5. See infra notes 110- 11 and accompanying text.
6. See id.
7. Black's Law Dictionary defines "expert witness" as "[one who by reason of education or specialized ex-
perience possesses superior knowledge respecting a subject about which persons having no particular training are
incapable of forming an accurate opinion or deducing correct conclusions . . . . One who by habits of life and




knowledge and skills similar to those duties owed clients by other professionals8
such as doctors, 9 engineers,10 accountants, 1' architects, 12 and attorneys. 13
I. INTRODUCTION
Most scientific or professional disciplines provide expert testimony in courts.
Product liability suits often involve engineering questions. Personal injury suits al-
most always require medical testimony. "Some [criminal] cases virtually cannot
be tried without the assistance of experts"- homicide (in which the cause of death
is determined by forensic pathologists), arson (in which fire marshals and chem-
ists may testify about the origin and cause of the fire), forgery (where document
examiners determine the authenticity of writing) and possession or sale of con-
trolled substances (where toxicologists or chemists determine the chemical nature
of the substances). 14 The National Center for State Courts conducted a nationwide
survey to determine the extent and nature of the use of expert testimony, and in
particular, the introduction of scientific evidence. 'I Almost half of the attorneys
responding to the survey encountered scientific testimony in a third of their
8. Note that a cause of action for clergymen malpractice has not succeeded. See Nally v. Grace Community
Church, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989). Nor have "educational malpractice"
claims succeeded. See, e.g., Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986).
9. "The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care,
skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and
appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.102(1) (West Supp.
1991). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 32 (5th ed. 1984) [here-
inafter KEETON et al.
10. See John C. Peck & Wyatt A. Hoch, Engineers'Liabiliy -State of the Art Considerations in Defining Stand-
ardof Care, TRIAL, Feb. 1987, at 42.
11. "When conducting an independent audit for a client, an accountant must provide auditing services with
reasonable care, in good faith, without fraud or collusion." Alan F. Garrison, Note, Common Law Malpractice
Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 187 (1987). See generally John A. Siliciano,
Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929 (1988). In the area of
accounting malpractice, there are three basic approaches to liability: (1) Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E.
441 (N.Y. 193 1), requires that the accountant know specifically that the third party acts in reliance on the infor-
mation; (2) recovery by third parties depends on whether the accountant intends or knows that the client intends
to supply others with information regardless of the accountant's knowledge of the particular identity of the third
party; and (3) Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983), permits recovery by parties who are reasona-
bly foreseeable recipients of reports for business purposes. Other courts have embraced the expanded liability
approach of Rosenblum. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss.
1987).
12. See NATHAN WALKER ET AL., LEGAL PITFALLS IN ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND BUILDING CON-
STRucrION (2d ed. 1979).
13. "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1. 1 (1987). "An attorney must possess the skill and knowledge possessed by other
members of the profession, and must execute the business entrusted to his professional management with a rea-
sonable degree of care, skill, and dispatch. If he fails to possess such care, skill, and dispatch, he is responsible to
his client for any loss resulting therefrom. The attorney's duty to his client in this regard is to be measured by the
community standards of professional conduct prevailing in the community in which he does his work." 4 FLA.
JUR. 2D § 168 (1986).
14. MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE USE OF SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 8 (1983) [hereinafter SAKs & VAN DUIZEND].
15. Edward J. Inwinkelried, The "Bases"of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony,
67 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988) (citing Study to Investigate Use of Scientific Evidence, NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS
RFEor, Sept. 1980, at 1).
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cases.16 "[C]ourts demand, and juries expect, that physical evidence will be prop-
erly collected and analyzed, and that the results will be available for examination at
trial by objective forensic scientists. ""
There has been a corresponding proliferation of witness brokers and clearing-
houses18 and a virtual explosion in the so-called "expert witness industry."19 Ac-
cording to Yale Law Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, "[i]t's an escalation on the
level of military preparedness. "20 This expert witness "explosion" and resulting
abuse" of the system has greatly concerned the scientific 22 and legal23 communi-
ties. People are beginning to question whether experts are merely "hired guns"
rather than truth tellers. "[M]any are expressing uneasiness about the influence
16. Id. at 1.
17. Irving C. Stone, Capabilities of Modern Forensic Laboratories, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659 (1984).
18. Expert Witnesses: Booming Business for the Specialists, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1987, at 1, 13 [hereinafter
Booming Business]. "The Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys, established in 1961 and based in Fort Wash-
ington, Pa., is one of the oldest and largest of such enterprises, with a reported annual growth rate of about 15
percent. According to its president, Edwin H. Sherman, the service has developed a nationwide list of about
10,000 experts grouped in 4,000 categories." Id. The National Forensic Center in Princeton, New Jersey lists
thousands of experts in their annual Forensic Services Directory, which is also published electronically on
LEXIS and WESTLAW computer systems.
19. Booming Business, supra note 18, at 13.
20. Id. at 1.
21. "The abuse consists in introducing overstated opinions by unqualified witnesses, based on unproven theo-
ries or insufficient facts. That sort of expert testimony creates the same potential for miscarriage of justice as the
rankest lay testimony. Worse still, since the lay attorneys and jurors lack the witnesses' expertise, it is less likely
that they will detect the fallacies in the witnesses' testimony." EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF AT-
TACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 496 (1982).
22. Ordway Hilton, A NewLookat Qualifying Expert Witnesses and the Doctrine of Privilege for Forensic Scien-
tists, 17 J. FORFNSIC Sci. 586, 587 (1972) [hereinafter Hilton]. Hilton states that the courts have:
meager guidelines for the evaluation of witnesses' qualifications . . . [and] the courts are in need of help
in screening witnesses so that well-qualified experts can actually assist the court in perplexing technical
questions, and the unqualified will not unwittingly confuse justice. The courts of a number of countries
maintain a list of qualified experts in particular fields of forensic science. . . . [Such a list of experts
could be created in the U.S.] with the aid of recognized leaders in the field, but with the final decision in
the hands of the courts. As with the legal profession the courts could create a "disbarment" proceeding for
the occasional nonethical expert witness.
Id. at 587-88.
23. See Barry M. Epstein & Marc S. Klein, The Use and Abuse of Expert Testimony in Product Liability
Actions, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 656 (1987).
Most recently, the United States Attorney General's Tort Policy Working Group expressed its concern
about the "increasingly serious problem" involving
reliance by judges and juries on noncredible scientific or medical testimony, studies or opinions. It
has become all too common for "experts" or "studies" on the fringes of or even well beyond the outer
parameters of mainstream scientific or medical views to be presented to juries as valid evidence from
which conclusions can be drawn. The use of such invalid scientific evidence (commonly referred to as
"junk science") has resulted in findings of causation which simply cannot be justified or understood
from the standpoint of the current state of credible scientific and medical knowledge. Most impor-
tantly, this development has led to a deep and growing cynicism about the ability of tort law to deal
with difficult scientific and medical concepts in a principled and rational way.
Id. at 656-57 (citation omitted).
In June 1989, the Defense Research Institute sponsored the first "National Invitational Conference on




and cost of expert witnesses as well as the looseness of the qualifications establish-
ing someone as an expert."24
II. THE EXPERT WITNESS "EXPLOSION"
There are three reasons for the expert witness "explosion": the loosening of the
standards of admissibility of scientific evidence; Americans' love of science and
awe of scientists; and attorneys' need, both actual and perceived, to call in special-
ists to aid them at trial.2 Perhaps the most significant of the three explanations for
the expert witness explosion was the liberalization of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence in 1975. Expert witnesses no longer need to possess academic degrees in
areas in which they are called to testify. Witnesses may now testify to their opinion
if it will assist the trier of fact. Experts may now give testimony based on no more
than their familiarity with the subject matter.26
The test of admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 70227 has "led to the
admission of opinions that are so nontechnical that they are best described as
'quasi-expert,' rather than expert, testimony."2" "[M]any such [experts] present
24. Booming Business, supra note 18, at 13. See Glover v. United States, 708 F. Supp. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1989),
where Judge I. Leo Glasser issued a stern warning to lawyers against allowing so-called "expert" witnesses to
testify who in reality have no competence to render the opinions they are asked to render; and In re Air Crash
Disaster v. Pan American World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986), where Judge Higginbotham crit-
icized the district court's admission of expert testimony.
In the field of questioned document examination there are more unqualified or poorly qualified expert
witnesses testifying on problems than in any other branch of the forensic sciences. Virtually anyone who
can profess some familiarity with handwriting and typewriting examination is able to qualify in the eyes
of the trial judge. Not even formal academic education or a baccalaureate degree is necessary. Handwrit-
ing teachers, typewriter repairmen, bank personnel, even housewives who have taken a correspondence
course in graphology or grapho-analysis (character reading) can claim such knowledge and have been
permitted to testify. Some have barely any knowledge of the fundamental principles involved in this com-
plex field.
Hilton, supra note 22, at 587.
25. See Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REviEw 595, 599 (1988).
26. See Gill v. Northshore Radiological Ass'n, 409 N.E.2d 248 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (unnecessary for ex-
pert to be a specialist in the area concerned).
27. FED. R. EvID. 702 states that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States has
proposed some changes to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. (The words crossed through are contained in the
present rule, and the underlined words are the proposed amendments to the rule.) The preliminary draft of the
proposed amendment states:
If Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge-information, in the form ofan
opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if (I) the information is reasonably reliable and will substan-
tially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, - and (2) the wit-
ness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide such
testimony, may tetify theret in the form Of an Opinicn or Otheri~e. Except with leave of court for good
cause shown, the witness shall not testify on direct examination in any civil action to any opinion or infer-
ence, or reason or basis therefor, that has not been seasonably disclosed as required by Rules 26 (a) (2) and
26(e) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FED. R. CIV. P. AND THE FED. R. EvID. 83 (Comm. on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 1991). The revision was intended to limit
the use, but increase the reliability, of expert testimony.
28. Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 473, 478 (1986) [hereinafter Wein-
stein].
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studies and express opinions that they might not be willing to express in an article
submitted to a refereed journal of their discipline or in other contexts subject to
peer review."29 The growing acceptance of the relevancy approach 30 and move-
ment away from the "general acceptance" test for admissibility established in Frye
v. United States3' has resulted in judges and juries increasingly weighing the scien-
tific merits of theories and techniques they may find strange and confusing.
32
The trial courts have broad discretion in determining what qualifications ex-
perts must have and what subjects they may address in their testimony. This dis-
cretion is, in most jurisdictions, not subject to appellate review absent a clear
showing of abuse.33 Federal and state courts adhere to the rule that "the trial judge
has broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert evi-
dence, and his action is to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous. 34 As early as
1867 the appellate courts determined that "[i]t was for the court in the first in-
stance to determine whether these witnesses possessed sufficient skill to entitle
them to give an opinion as experts . . . . [I]t is for the jury to determine what
weight should be given to such evidence ....
The second explanation for the expert witness "explosion" lies in the signifi-
cance of science in our traditions and popular culture. Judges and jurors have cer-
tain expectations regarding scientific evidence. It has been said that science is the
American Faith.36 "We believe in things that can be proven. We test our cars for
safety, our children for health, and our employees for drug use.""
Celebrated trials such as that of Wayne Williams38 in Georgia, William Ken-
nedy Smith in Florida, 39 or Jeffrey Dahmer in Wisconsin4" have so raised the pub-
29. In re Air Crash Disaster v. Pan American World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
30. This approach weighs the probative value of evidence against countervailing dangers and considerations.
Paul C. Gianneli, Evidentiary and Procedural Rules Governing Erpert Testimony, 34 J. FORENSIC Sci. 730, 735-36
(1989). See also Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 245
(1986).
31. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye "general acceptance" test for admissibility
of novel scientific evidence is drawn from the oft-quoted language of the case:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recog-
nized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014.
32. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Science Takes the Stand: The Growing Misuse of Expert Testimony, 26 ScIENCEs
Nov. -Dec. 1986, at 20, 23 [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Science Takes the Stand].
33. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 507 So. 2d 554 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Crawford v. Shivashankar, 474 So. 2d 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Hawthorne v.
State, 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
34. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962) (citation omitted).
35. State v. Ward, 39 Vt. 225, 236-37 (1867).
36. John Veilleux, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEo. L.J. 1967 (1987).
37. Id.
38. Williams v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40 (Ga. 1983).
39. State v. Smith, No. 91-5482 (Palm Beach Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 11, 1991). See generally New Smith Evidence
a Puzzle; Information Doesn't Back Either Side, NEWSDAY, July 26, 1991, at 5.
40. State v. Dahmer, No. F-9-12542 (Milwaukee Co. Cir. Ct. Feb. 12, 1992); see generally, The Door of Evil,
PEOPLE, Aug. 12, 1991, at 32.
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lic's expectation of scientific proof at trial that many prosecutors now feel
obligated to call forensic experts to the witness stand to explain why physical evi-
dence is absent. 1 The unexplained absence of such evidence may lead jurors to
conclude that the prosecution has failed to make its case. The media has influ-
enced the public's expectations of the strength of scientific evidence through its
dramatization of such evidence. 2
Seventy percent of judges and lawyers indicate that juries attribute more credi-
bility to scientific evidence than other evidence, and seventy-five percent believe
that judges find scientific evidence more credible.' Jurors tend to give undue
weight to experts' opinions because "we're all taught to believe science is infalli-
ble." Professor Steven Goldberg notes that when he asks his Law and Science
seminar students to write down the name of the most brilliant person who ever
lived, scientists are most frequently named, followed by artists and musicians, an
occasional vote for Freud, and the great philosophers such as Plato.4
Some studies have supported the argument that jurors are impressed by scien-
tific evidence.4 It has been found that the expert source of the testimony, rather
than the number of sources or witnesses, may have the more significant effect on
verdicts. 7 Even the courts have noted that "scientific proof may . . . assume a
posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen . . . . " There is a
concern that juries give too much weight to scientific evidence and may, rather
41. Imwinkelried, Science Takes the Stand, supra note 32, at 23.
42. A study of 1,500 jurors regarding fingerprint evidence found that 71.9 % of jurors' primary sources of
knowledge of fingerprints comes from television and newspapers. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JURIES, FINGERPRINTS
AND THE EXPERT FINGERPRINT WITNESS 15 (1987). Unfortunately the media does not always accurately portray
forensic evidence. An example is The Naked Lie, a made-for-T.V. movie in which a warrant for the arrest of a
murderer is obtained based upon a single bloody hair and a voiceprint. In reality, neither would be a positive
indicator of the identity of a suspect. See also Robert M. Jarvis, Serial Killers and the Silver Screen: Mixing Up
Fact and Myth, presented at American Academy of Forensic Sciences 41 st Annual Meeting (February 16, 1989)
(expressing concern about the accuracy of forensic information as portrayed in serial killer movies).
43. SAKS & VAN DUIZEND, supra note 14, at 5-6 (citation omitted).
44. Amy DePaul, The Rape Trauma Syndrome: New Weaponsfor Prosecutors, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1,
20 (quoting defense attorney Jim Kemper). Note that "the stereotype of the scientist as a high-minded seeker of
the truth is being cast aside by some of the latest literature. Science is not a monastic calling but a tough political
game in which the scientists are howling, scrapping alley cats." Robert Kanigel & Geoffrey Cowley, The Seamy
Side of Science, 28 SCIENCES July-Aug. 1988, at 46, 47.
45. Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEo. L.J. 1341 (1987). Inter-
estingly, no student ever names a lawyer. Professor Goldberg has also "asked the same question of scientists, mu-
sicians, and others, and the result is always the same. No one ever names a lawyer." Id.
46. See Steven M. Egesdal, Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical Eval-
uation, 74 GEo. L.J. 1769 (1986); Elizabeth F. Loftus, PsychologicalAspects of Courtroom Testimony, ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 27 (1980). See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standardfor Admitting Scientific Evidence: A
Critique from the Prospective ofJuror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REv. 554 (1982- 83) [hereinafter Juror Psychology].
47. See, e.g., Kurt Ludwig & Gary Fontaine, Effect of Witnesses'Expertness and Manner of Delivery of Testi-
mony on Verdicts of Simulated Jurors, 42 PSYCHOL. REP. 955-61 (1978). In one particular study, "jurors" heard
testimony delivered by either a physician, a police officer or lay person as witness. Id. The "case" involved crimi-
nal charges and the specific testimony concerned the intoxication of the victim at the time of the incident. Id. The
"witnesses" delivered the testimony against the "defendant" in either an opinionated or non-opinionated manner.
Id. Results indicated that verdicts and sentences were most severe following testimony given by the police officer.
Id. The study was based on 68 undergraduate subjects. Id.
48. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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than rely upon their own cognitive skills to evaluate and weigh all other evidence,
overestimate its probative value.49
According to two studies of the uses and effects of forensic science,o on the av-
erage, police are about three times more likely to solve cases when scientific evi-
dence is gathered and analyzed." "Prosecutors are less likely . . . to enter into
plea negotiations if forensic evidence strongly associates the defendant with the
crime . . . . [In addition], sentences tend to be more severe when forensic evi-
dence is presented at trials."52 Juries consider scientific evidence trustworthy, and
not subject to human emotions and distortion. 3 A quarter of the jurors surveyed in
one study said that without forensic evidence, they would have decided the case
differently (usually an acquittal instead of a guilty verdict)." In the cases in which
expert witnesses testified, they were ranked the most persuasive of all wit-
nesses. 55
Finally, the high degree of informational and technological specialization in our
society makes the use of expert witnesses imperative. Expert witnesses can pro-
vide a trier of fact with the tools by which it can better understand the issues to
reach an intelligent decision. However, if the trier of fact's knowledge is so limited
that it cannot make a considered decision on its own, it is completely dependent on
whatever opinions and conclusions are expressed by the expert. Experts for each
side of the controversy may present sharply different views, and the trier of fact
must sort through these conflicting opinions to make its decision. As a result, the
work is often based on the jurors' or judge's perceptions as to which expert is the
most qualified, has the most prestigious credentials or is the most well-known
writer or lecturer in a particular field. The fact finders are sometimes misled by
the experts. 6 As Judge Weinstein has said, "[I]t is naive to expect the trier of fact to
be capable of assessing the validity of diametrically opposed testimony."" "As so-
ciety becomes more complex and technologically oriented, the lay fact finder's
ability to comprehend scientific evidence becomes increasingly suspect."58 While
there are exceptions," few courts are willing to simply disbelieve scientists.
49. Juror Psychology, supra note 46, at 562.
50. Forensic science is the application of science to matters of law. PETER DEFOREST ET AL., FORENSIC SCI-
ENCE AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINALISTICS 1 (1983).
51. Joseph L. Peterson, Use of Forensic Evidence by the Police and Courts, NAT' L INST. OF JUSTICE: RESEARCH
IN BRIEF, Oct. 1987, at 2.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. Rape cases involving semen evidence were usually the ones in which jurors considered forensic evi-
dence crucial.
55. Id.
56. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 482.
57. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 706[01], at 706-09 (1991).
58. John W. Wesley, Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question ofJudicial Capacity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
675, 679 (1984) [hereinafter Wesley].
59. Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984). The court stated, "[tlhis Court is disap-
pointed with the apparent fact that these so-called experts can take such license from the witness stand; these
witnesses say and conclude things which, in the Court's view, they could not dare report in a peer-reviewed for-
mat." id. at 415.
[Vol. 12:39
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A judge's skill and knowledge should enable him or her to comprehend complex
scientific evidence more easily than jurors who may lack extensive formal educa-
tion. However, a trial judge's education does not necessarily provide the technical
skills necessary to fully comprehend complex scientific evidence.6" "Trial
judges .. .rarely have a technical background. Accordingly, the trial judge
...may fail to fully comprehend complex scientific evidence."61 Appellate
courts may also be uninformed regarding scientific developments.62 It is rare that a
judge goes to extraordinary lengths to become educated in scientific matters when
faced with a scientific or technical trial.63 Perhaps as Judge Higginbotham stated,
"it is time to take hold of expert testimony .... "64
In this age of specialization, attorneys are constantly searching for those experts
who can testify to matters which will either prove a client's innocence or negate a
client's guilt or liability. Unfortunately, many of those in the growing pool of ex-
perts were not what they appeared to be.65 Even those experts whose credentials
were impeccable began feeling the pressure from the legal community to state
opinions based upon the outcome desired by the attorneys and not upon the actual
facts in the case.66 The incredible monetary gain to be had by providing a "good"
opinion exerted additional pressure upon the experts. 67 "[S]ome will say anything
people want to hear if they are paid enough."68
Compounding the problem is the lack of standards of care in some experts'
fields by which to measure their performance. 69 Also lacking is a consistent sys-
tem of peer review for expert witnesses.70 When the standards set are sufficiently
60. The Judicial College in Reno, Nevada has recently added forensic science courses to its curriculum.
61. Wesley, supra note 58, at 685.
62. For example, in State v. Sharbono, 563 P.2d 61 (Mont. 1977), the Montana Supreme Court repeatedly
referred to the gas chromatograph as the gaschrome-biograph and even referred to a non-existent gaschrome-bi-
ography journal.
63. An excellent illustration of enlightened judicial practice was provided by Judge Finesilver in the swine flu
cases where plaintiffs sued the United States for complications resulting from vaccines. See, e.g., Gundy v.
United States, 728 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1984); Kynaston v. United States, 717 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1983).
He was assigned to try all such cases in each of the district courts in his circuit. During the course of a
year, he settled or tried over one hundred cases, attaining expertise in the process by listening to many
expert witnesses on both sides and by studying all the literature. In addition to his readings, he attended a
course dealing with related problems in the local medical school, enabling him to better understand the
scientific issues and terminology.
Weinstein, supr note 28, at 495.
64. In re Air Crash Disaster v. Pan American World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
65. See infra notes 72-167 and accompanying text.
66. Michael H. Graham, Note, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate
Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 45.
67. Bachner, J., ENR Management and Labor, Oct. 23, 1986, at 40.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Saul Boyarsky, Standard of Care: Straight or Wavy Lines, Presented at the American Academy
of Forensic Sciences 41st Annual Meeting (Feb. 17, 1989). Some professions have responded to the proliferation
of"hired guns" by producing documents outlining professional standards. See, e.g., The Association of Engineer-
ing Firms Practicing in the Geosciences'Document: Recommended Practices for Design Professionals Engaged as
Experts in the Resolution of Construction Industry Disputes, TYIE ExPERT WITNESS J., July 1989, at 1.
70. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
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high, the efforts of professional groups may be sufficient to convince the courts to
refuse to permit the testimony of marginal experts.71
HI. THE PROBLEM OF NEGLIGENCE AND FRAUD
IN THE EXPERT COMMUNITY
While the focus of this article is expert witness negligence, the problem of ex-
pert witness fraud also needs to be addressed. Contrary to what many legal practi-
tioners think,72 fraud and negligence73 by experts is a serious problem. One need
only read the newspapers or scan NEXIS74 to see overwhelming evidence of the
extent of the problem."
Fraudulent credentials, research fraud, and negligence by experts are not recent
phenomena. One of the earliest and best known instances of scientific fraud is the
case of Cyril Burt's falsified studies on the inheritability of intelligence.76 Burt be-
lieved intelligence was inherited; his theory was that the children of wealthy, edu-
cated families did better on intelligence tests than the children of working-class
families.77 Beginning in the 1930's, his research, including studies of identical
twins separated at birth, supported his contention.78 His work was a standard of
psychological research for over thirty years until Dr. Leon Kamin looked at Burt's
data and noticed that it had a remarkable property -as Burt kept increasing his
sample size throughout his lifetime the statistical results remained identical to the
third decimal place, a statistical impossibility.
79
Studies on the phenomena of research fraud generally reflect a range of views
from one that scientists are 99.99% pure, to the view that over 90% of scientists
71. See William W. Willis, The Expert Witness, IDENTIFICATION NEws, May 1983, at 7.
72. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Washington Defense Trial Lawyers, Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assoc.
Eng'r, Inc., 776 P.2d 666 (Wash. 1989) (No. 55250-9).
73. See, e.g., Frank E. James, Local Coroners'Lack of Forensic Training Raises Issue of Fitness, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 16, 1988, at 1. In this article Mr. James recounts many instances of incompetence with disastrous conse-
quences. One example is the Wheatland, Wyoming case of Martin Frias, who was convicted of the murder of his
girlfriend. Id. Mr. Frias was eventually granted a new trial and was acquitted after a forensic pathologist reexam-
ined the case and determined that the coroner's ruling that the death was a homicide and not a suicide was errone-
ous. Id. Mr. Frias spent three years in jail as a result of the negligence of the coroner. Id.
Incompetence has been cited by the respondents to studies of forensic experts and ethics as the most serious of
the ethical problems facing forensic scientists. Michael J. Saks, Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in
Forensic Science, 34 J. FORENSIC SC. 772, 780 (1989).
74. NEXIS is an automated database produced by Mead Data Central which offers access to the full text of
wire services, magazines, and newspapers. For detailed information on obtaining and using NEXIS, see Guide
to NEXIS and Related Services (1986).
75. See Joan E. Van Tol, Detecting, Deterring and Punishing The Use of Fraudulent Academic Credentials: A
Play in Two Acts, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 791 (1990) [hereinafter Van Toll.
76. See L.S. Hearnshaw, Cyril Burt, Psychologist (1979). But, for a view disputing the fraud charges against
Burt, after reexamination of the circumstantial evidence, see Ronald Fletcher, Science, Ideology, and the Media:
The Cyril Burt Scandal (1991).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Scientists Who Cheat (PBS television broadcast of NOVA production, Oct. 25, 1988).
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"had direct or indirect knowledge of intentional bias including data massage and
research fabrication. "80
A. False or Fraudulent Credentials
Many instances of expert witnesses' false or fraudulent credentials have re-
cently come to light.8 During the 100th Congress, hearings were held on scien-
tific fraud and misconduct before the House Subcommittee on Human Resources
and Intergovernmental Relations2
Attorneys have an obligation to investigate the credentials of expert witnesses to
avoid perjurious testimony;'S however, such verification is not always sought.8 It
is not always convenient for a court or an attorney to investigate the credentials of
expert witnesses while contending with their full-time schedules. Instead, experts
are often hired by attorneys or accepted by the courts based upon their current po-
sition, status or reputation. Experts' credentials are often accepted at face value
even though the information was supplied by the expert with little or no indepen-
dent verification. For example, the Deputy Director of the Suffolk County New
80. Patricia K. Woolf, Deception in Scientific Research, 29 JURiMETRICS J. 67, 71 (1988) (citation omitted)
[hereinafter Woolf].
81. See, e.g., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1379 (1 th Cir. 1988), where the court
held that the investors' expert witness' perjury warranted the vacation of the arbitrators' punitive damages award.
Id. at 1379. The credentials claimed by the expert witness were completely false. Id. at 1384.
Thomas E. Nix, of Florence, Ala., pled guilty to one count of making false statements in a lawsuit in United
States District Court in Tampa. "Expert Witness" Taints Cases Because of False Credentials, FT. LAUDERDALE
NEWS/SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 23, 1988, at 13A. He was an engineering student at the University of Alabama but
never graduated from that institution. Id. Furthermore, he never attended Columbia University or worked for St.
Paul as claimed. Id.
82. Scientific Fraud and Misconduct and the Federal Response: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Re-
sources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988). See also AM. Ass'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE-AM. BAR ASS'N, PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC
FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT: REPORT ON WORKSHOP No. 2 (1989). Other Congressional investigations have deter-
mined that there may be more than 500,000 or one in 200 working Americans who have obtained employment
based on some form of fraudulent credential. This includes 10,000 doctors practicing with falsified or question-
able credentials. "As many as 30 million or one in 3 currently employed Americans are hired with credentials
which have been altered in some shape or form" from manipulation of a resume to adding a non-existent ad-
vanced degree. Fraudulent Credentials: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care and
the Subcomm. on Housing and Consumer Interests of Select Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 1 st Sess. 3, 4 (1985).
83. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1990).
84. See People v. Cornille, 448 N.E.2d 857, 865-66 (Ill. 1983) (where the court stated, "it is obvious that
every party . . . has an obligation to verify the credentials of its expert witnesses"); People v. Hanna, 457
N.E.2d 1352 (I11. App. Ct. 1983).
The American Academy of Forensic Science's Jurisprudence Section is presently considering a proposed code
of professionalism for attorneys in their professional associations with expert witnesses. Section and Program
News:Jurisprudence, ACADEMY NEWS, Mar. 1989, at 5. One of the proposed tenets of the code requires an attor-
ney to verify his expert witness' credentials. Id.
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York Crime Laboratory made many court appearances as an expert serologist.8"
However, when the Long Island newspaper, Newsday, commenced a series of ar-
ticles on the mismanagement of the Suffolk County Criminal Justice System, it
discovered that the deputy director had completely false credentials.8
In United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. ,87 the government's ex-
pert witness' fraud was exposed after he testified falsely to having possessed cer-
tain degrees.88 Fortunately for the government's case, this unmasking was found to
not be fatal since the witness functioned primarily as a supervisor, and qualified
personnel had performed the various tests about which he had testified, thus al-
lowing the court to uphold the verdict.89
Investigative journalists in Illinois discovered the false qualifications of a fire
investigator with fourteen years experience.9" The investigation revealed a com-
pletely fraudulent academic background, as the witness had never received a col-
lege degree, but was actually suspended from college on several occasions for
poor scholastic achievement.91 His testimony in People v. Cornille,92 as to the cause
of a fire, "provided the crucial link in the prosecutor's case . . . . ,93 The court
had no choice but to order a new trial two years later.94 The court found that the
prosecutor's lack of diligence in verifying the expert's supposed qualifications was
equivalent to a knowing use of false testimony.9 As the court saw it, "[i]t would
have been a simple procedure in this case for the state to have verified [the wit-
ness'] qualifications before he testified at Cornille's trial" since the information to
verify his statements was "readily available."96 The court stated "it [was] only fair
to charge [the prosecution] with the responsibility for the imposter's false testi-
85. T.J. Maier, Records Show Expert Misstated Credentials, NEWSDAY, Dec. 10, 1986, at 19; James E. Starrs,
Louring Themes: Of Experts Who Lie and Dirty Harry, Sci. SLEUTHING NEWSL. (Forensic Sci. Dep't of Geo.
Wash. U., Washington, D.C.), Summer 1987, at 1 [hereinafter Starrs, Dirty Harry]. While the expert did hold a
bachelor's degree from C.W. Post Campus of Long Island University he also claimed to have a bachelor's degree
in biology from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and a masters degree in forensic science from the City Univer-
sity of New York's John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Starrs, Dirty Harry, at 2. He was arrested on three felony
counts of perjury in the first degree and pled guilty to three misdemeanor charges of perjury which necessitated
his resignation from various professional organizations of which he was a member and which resulted in his be-
ing sentenced to three years probation and a $3,000 fine. Id.
86. Starrs, Dirty Harry, supra note 85, at 2.
87. 540 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1085.
90. James E. Starrs & Charles R. Midkiff, Expert Witness - Bogus Fire Expert Brings Reversal of llinois Ar-
son Conviction, SCL SLEUTHING NEWSL. (The Mid-Atlantic Ass'n of Forensic Scientists, Oakton, Va.), July
1983, at 4 [hereinafter Starrs & Midkiff, Bogus Fire Expert].
91. He allegedly had an associate degree from Wright College in Chicago, a bachelor's degree in chemistry
from the Illinois School of Technology and 25 post graduate credits in optics and physics. Id. At some trials he
also credited himself with work at Roosevelt University. Id.
92. 448 N.E.2d 857 (III. 1983). See also Starrs & Midkiff, Bogus Fire Expert, supra note 90, at 4-5.
93. Starrs & Midkiff, Bogus Fire Expert, supra note 90, at 4.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 5.
96. Cornille, 448 N.E.2d at 865.
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mony," 7 as it "made the mistake of producing an expert witness who was an im-
poster. "98
Even the federal government's agencies have had problems with employees
with fraudulent credentials. A special agent with the FBI Laboratory Serology
Unit repeatedly testified that he had a master's degree in science, when in fact he
had no degrees beyond his bachelor's degree.99 He testified in at least twenty-two
trials in which the government obtained convictions. 00
Experts for the defense in criminal cases have also testified falsely regarding
their qualifications. In Kline v. State,' the expert in forensic hypnosis hired by
Ted Bundy was discovered to have testified falsely that he had a doctorate degree
and had completed post-doctoral work.1"2 He was convicted of perjury.' The
court held that false testimony with regard to one's qualifications is material and
thus sufficient to support a perjury conviction. "4
There have also been instances in which experts testified regarding results of
tests which they never performed. ' For example, Delbert J. Lacefield, the Direc-
tor of the Forensic Toxicology Laboratory operated by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration pled guilty in an Oklahoma City Federal District Court to having
falsified his reporting of drug test results when he, in fact, had not conducted any
tests. 106
It does not follow necessarily that the discovery of an expert witness' fraudulent
credentials will result in a new trial or a perjury conviction. Instead courts may
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. State v. Ruybal, 408 A.2d 1284, 1285 (Me. 1979). See also Starrs, Dirty Harry, supra note 85, at 2.
100. See Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449,460 (D.C. 1981). See also Starrs, Dirty Harry, supra note 85,
at 2.
101. 444 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1104. The judge at the original trial stated that Kline would have been considered an expert in this
field even without his phony doctorate. Id.
105. For an example of a civil case in which this has occurred, see Harre v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 750 F.2d
1501 (11 th Cir. 1985). The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion for relief
from judgment after the plaintiff demonstrated that a key defense expert had falsified his credentials in order to
be permitted to testify on the ultimate issue in the case. Id. at 1505. The defense expert testified that he had con-
ducted experiments on the Dalkon Shield contraceptive device and the tail string's role in the transmission of bac-
teria. Id. at 1502. Thus, he was permitted to testify that the Dalkon Shield did not contribute to the plaintiffs
illness, did not transmit bacteria and was not unreasonably dangerous for use as an IUD. Id. The plaintiff later
discovered that the defense expert had never performed the experiment he described in his testimony. Id. at 1503.
106. Doctor Guilty of Falsifying Drug Tests in Accident Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1987, at A 19. See Ruybal,
408 A.2d at 1285. See also State v. DeFronzo, 394 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ohio Misc. 1978) (expert represented
that certain laboratory test was conducted when no such test was ever conducted); Stars, Dirty Harry, supra note
85.
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conclude that the expert is qualified to testify on other grounds, the expert's credi-
bility is not significantly affected or the expert is immune from suit.10 7
B. Negligence
Although there is no available data to show its precise dimensions, negligence
by experts is widespread. Consider the instances of medical malpractice as an
analogy."08 It is estimated "that only 10 percent of the incidents of genuine medical
negligence lead to a claim."109
Even with well-accepted scientific techniques, negligence occurs. In North
Carolina, officials had to reconsider 159 criminal cases because local authorities
discovered questionable fingerprint identifications.' 10 The fingerprint misidentifi-
cation resulted in two murder charges being dropped by the district attorney's of-
fice.111 There are many other examples.112 In June 1985 Bruce Basden was
arrested and indicted for the murders of Remus and Blanche Adams in Fayetteville
North Caroliana on the basis of a fingerprint found in the decedents' home.113 Bas-
107. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 439 A.2d 255 (R.I. 1982). This case involved the murder trial of a Rhode Is-
land man accused of shooting through a window of the victim's residence and hitting the victim four times. Id. at
256. The expert witness was called to testify about the comparison testing the FBI performed on glass found at
the crime scene and glass found on the defendant's and his accomplice's clothing. Id. at 260. During direct exami-
nation of the special agent, to establish his qualifications, the agent testified that in addition to training he re-
ceived from the FBI in glass and soil identification, he had a "bachelor's degree, a master's degree, and a
doctorate in geology from the University of Arkansas." Id. at 260-61. As a result of his list of qualifications,
defense counsel stipulated to the witness' expertise and declined to cross examine on the issue of qualifications.
Id. at 261. Subsequent to the defendant's conviction it was discovered that the expert witness could not possibly
possess a doctorate in geology because during the time of his attendance, the University of Arkansas did not have
a doctorate program in geology. Id. He did, however, obtain a doctorate in clay mineralogy. Id. The trial court
found that even though the special agent did not have a doctorate degree in geology, he remained qualified as an
expert in the area about which he had testified. Id. Furthermore, his testimony concerning his degree did not
affect his credibility significantly, because he later explained that he considered his degree to be in the field of
geology of which clay mineralogy is merely a subfield. Id. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the trial
court's conviction of the defendant for first degree murder after finding ample evidence to support the position
that "the distinction between the nomenclature of degrees was of no substantial difference." Id. See also Briscoe
v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (police fingerprint expert gave perjured testimony but Court held he was immune
from suit); James E. Starrs & Charles R. Midkiff, Expert Witness -FBI Agent's Misstatement of His Qualifica-
tions Not Grounds for Murder Conviction Reversal, SC. SLEUTHING NEWSL. (The Mid-Atlantic Ass'n of Forensic
Scientists, Oakton, Va.), Apr. 1983, at 7.
108. The best available data . . . [is] from a study conducted in the mid- 1970's. Jointly sponsored by the Cali-
fornia Medical Association and the California Hospital Association, this investigation used a team of experts to
search hospital records for incidents of "patient disabilities caused by health-care management." . .. [Tihey
found about one episode of malpractice in every 100 hospital admissions. William Ira Bennett, Body and Mind;
Pluses of Malpractice Suits, N.Y. TIMEs, July 24, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 31-32 [hereinafter Bennett].
109. Id. at 32.
110. Barry Bowden and Mike Barrett, Fingerprint Errors Raise Questions on Local Convictions, FAYETTEVILLE
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1988, at LA.
11l. Id.
112. In In re Kirschke, 125 Cal. Rptr. 680, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), a firearms identification expert "negli-
gently presented false demonstrative evidence in support of his ballistics testimony." For additional illustrations
of erroneous expert testimony, see James E. Starrs, In the Land ofAgog: An Allegory for the Expert Witness, 30 J.
FORENSIC Sci. 289 (1985) and the quarterly Scientific Sleuthing Review edited by Professor James Starrs and Cha-
rles Midkiff.
113. James E. Starts, More Saltimbancos on the Loose?- Fingerprint Experts Caught in a Whorl of Error, Sci.
SLEUTHING NEWSL. (Forensic Sci. Dep't of Geo. Wash. U., Washington, D.C.), Spring 1988, at I [hereinafter
Fingerprint Experts]. Identifications that had convicted Morris Gaining of burglary have already resulted in the
award of a new trial. Id. at 5.
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den's attorney requested funds to have the fingerprint evidence reappraised and
filed a motion to discover the physical evidence in the possession of the state." 4
"At this point the state's fingerprint expert made enlargements of the prints from
which he had made an identification of Basden as the intruder . . . . [The state's
expert] admitted that he found unexplained dissimilarities along with similarities
in the prints."115 These discrepancies caused him to change his mind. The state
subsequently dismissed all charges against Basden, who had been incarcerated in
the local jail for thirteen months. " '
The fingerprint examiner's explanation for his mistake was that he did not make
photographic enlargements of Basden's prints and the latent print from the crime
scene until the public defender's discovery motion.117 The enlargements detailed
the differences rather than the similarities in the prints.118 However, in the regular
course of fingerprint comparison, enlargements are the rule rather than the excep-
tion.119 The FBI and North Carolina authorities were then summoned to reevalu-
ate the fingerprint work done by the State's fingerprint examiners.12 The FBI
reappraised fifty-one identifications made in 1986.121 The North Carolina State
Bureau of Investigation examined 118 fingerprint identifications made in 1987. 122
The FBI review revealed that "three fingerprints did not belong to three defendants
in three separate cases." '23
The entire Los Angeles Police Department ballistics unit was evaluated after
technicians misread firearms evidence in a murder case.124 The forensic experts
conclusively linked Deputy Rickey Ross's gun to the murders of three prosti-
tutes. 12 A defense expert concluded Ross's gun could not have fired the bullets and
independent experts found there was insufficient evidence to make any identifica-






119. See geneally PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARDJ. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1986) [hereinafter
GIANELLI & IMWINKELRIED]; ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (3d ed.
1986) [hereinafter MOENSSENS].




124. 15 LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWS, June 30, 1981, at 1. See also Bob Baker & Paul Lieberman, Faulty Ballis-
tics in Deputy'Arrest; Eagerness to Make'Gun Cited in LAPD Lab Error, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1989, at 1; David
Freed, LAPD Probing What Went Wrong With Ballistics Tests on Ross' Gun, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1989, at 26
[hereinafter Freed]. "Firearms identification is the study by which a bullet, cartridge case or shotshell casing may
be identified as having been fired by a particular weapon to the exclusion of all other weapons." MOENSSENS,
supr note 119, at 385 (quoting FB.I., HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 52 (rev. ed. 1981)).
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cials launched an investigation into the ballistics unit to determine the root of the
problem. 2 8
In Tucson, Arizona, "the prime time rapist" '129 investigation mistakenly con-
cluded that Michael Cooper was the suspect. 130 Latent finger prints from two dif-
ferent rape scenes were attributed to him. 131 Michael Cooper spent seven months
waiting for the misidentification to be rectified. 132 He filed a damage claim against
the sheriff, the police department and the City of Tucson for the denial of his civil
rights by his false arrest. 133 Three forensic scientists involved in the misidentifica-
tion received administrative sanctions. 134
In State v. Caldwell,13 a murder case, one of the crucial pieces of evidence was
a latent fingerprint developed on an "envelope . . . which was addressed to the de-
fendant and appeared to be in his handwriting. A gold coin was found inside,
which was identified as one missing from [the decedent's] home. The defendant
[the deceased's son-in-law] was said to have an interest in coin collecting."136
During the course of the trial, the state presented the testimony of an agent of
the Colorado Bureau of Investigation who had been assigned to the laboratory sec-
tion for nine and one-half years. 
137
He testified to having experience in fingerprint work over a period of fourteen and
one-half years, including some "240 to 300 hours of actual classroom training" with
the FBI. His experience included having conducted "approximately 60,000 exami-
nations" of fingerprints. The [agent] testified . . . he [had] developed a latent fin-
gerprint after spraying it with ninhydrin.13 8 He photographed the print immediately
after it appeared upon being sprayed and heated with an iron to shorten the time of
128. Id.
129. Fingerprint Experts, supra note 113, at 6. The perpetrator received this name from the press corps be-







135. 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982). See also James E. Starrs, A Miscue in Fingerprint Identification: Causes
and Concerns, 12 J. POLICE ScI. AND ADMIN. 287 (1984); James E. Starrs, To Err is Human, Infallibility is Di-
vine-A Closer Look, with a Doppler Effect, State v. Caldwell, 322 N. W2d 574 (Minn. 1982) -Part I1, SCt.
SLEUTHING NEWSL. (The Mid-Atlantic Ass'n of Forensic Scientists, Oakton, Va.), Oct. 1983, at 10 [hereinafter
Doppler Effect] ; James E. Starrs, To Err is Human, Infallibility is Divine-Misidentified Fingerprint Results in Re-
versal ofMinnesota First-Degree Murder Conviction-Part 1, Sci. SLEUTHING NEWSL. (The Mid-Atlantic Ass'n of
Forensic Scientists, Oakton, Va.), Jan. 1983, at I [hereinafter Misidentified Fingerprint].
136. Misidentified Fingerprint, supra note 135, at 2.
137. Misidentified Fingerprint, supra note 135, at 2.
138. Porous surfaces, such as a paper envelope, are difficult surfaces from which to obtain latent fingerprints.
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 119, at 505, 510-11; MOENSSENS, supra note 119, at 420, 433. Ninhy-
drin is a chemical which, when sprayed on the surface bearing the latent print, reacts to the amino acids left by the
skin. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 119, at 505, 510-11; MOENSSENS, supra note 119, at 420, 433.
After spraying, the print becomes visible and can be photographed. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note
119, at 505, 510-11; MOENSSENS, supra note 119, at 420, 433. See also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHEMICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATENT IMPRESSIONS (1980).
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the chemical's reaction. Using the negative of that latent print139 he made an enlarge-
ment for use at the defendant's trial, which was part of a photographic chart used for
demonstrative purposes ... 140
The agent positively identified the latent print as that of the right thumb of the
defendant. 141 "His identification was based on 'a total eleven points' of similarity
and no unexplainable differences between the latent and inked prints."1 42 Approxi-
mately a year after the analysis, the defense counsel consulted another fingerprint
expert who evaluated the enlargement of the negative and defendant's known
prints and agreed with the state's expert's opinion.1" "The defense did not call its
own expert to testify."1" The defendant was convicted on both murder counts. 
1 41
The defendant's wife, Marjorie Caldwell, was also tried for the murders but was
acquitted. 1" "At Marjorie Caldwell's trial, the negative of the fingerprint was re-
turned from Colorado where it was on file and the enlargements and contact prints
prepared from it were re-examined by three fingerprint experts, all of whom
agreed that 'the print . . . could not have been [Mr. Caldwell's].' "147 "One ex-
pert . . . noted that the [Colorado] state expert had mounted his enlargement at
an incorrect angle to use for demonstrative purposes at the appellant's trial. He
also stated that the print 'was a very poor latent print to try to identify' in the first
place." 1" He also disagreed with the government expert's claimed eleven points of
similarity. Two other fingerprint experts also concluded it was not Caldwell's fin-
gerprint. 1 4' Roger Caldwell then filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence.150 The Minnesota Supreme Court, holding that the changed
circumstances since the time of the trial mandated a new trial, stated: "The finger-
print expert's testimony was damning-and it was false.""1 "[A]s uncontradicted
as it was, it 'destroyed the credibility of the testimony of appellant's handwriting
139. Each ridge of the fingers, palms, and sole bears a row of sweat pores which in the average person con-
stantly exude perspiration. Also, the ridges of the fingers and palms are in intermittent contact with other
parts of the body, such as the hair and face, and with various objects, which may leave a film of grease or
moisture on the ridges. In touching an object, the film of moisture and/or grease may be transferred to the
object, thus leaving an outline of the ridges of the fingers or palm thereon. This print is called a latent
impression, the word "latent" meaning hidden, that is, the print many times is not readily visible.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTS 170 (1984).
140. Misidentified Fingerprint, supra note 135, at 2.
141. Id.
142. Id. The International Association for Identification (IAI) has consistently maintained that no minimum
number of points of similarity will be prescribed by it for a match to exist between a known and unknown finger-
print. Doppler Effect, supra note 135, at 11. In England, sixteen separate points of similarity are a prerequisite to
identification. Id. In the Republic of Ireland, twelve such points will suffice. Id. In the United States experts have
concluded that anywhere from eight to ten points of similarity are appropriate for an identification to be made. Id.








151. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Minn. 1982).
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expert' and it was the only solid evidence placing the defendant [at the scene]. It
was therefore wrong for a conviction to rest so significantly on 'totally incorrect
evidence.' "2
The identification error made by the state's expert in the Caldwell case, as well
as the defense expert's confirmation of the erroneous identification, resulted in
both experts' certifications being revoked by the International Association for
Identification (IAI). "I Errors in fingerprint examinations may also result from a
failure to raise a latent print." This was the situation in Imbler v. Craven. "' In
that case the state's fingerprint expert found "two fragmentary" prints on a razor
case discovered in a pocket in a topcoat discarded by a robbery/murder suspect.
The prints were deemed to be unidentifiable. After Imbler's conviction another
expert for the defense discovered a third and identifiable print on the same razor
case. This print did not belong to Imbler. "I All the evidence indicates that this
print was on the case at the time of trial. 57
The expert's testimony raised an additional problem. He stated that the first two
latent prints were too fragmentary to make an identification even when compared
with the exemplars.5 8 Nevertheless, his testimony and police logs revealed he
made such comparisons.159 In light of the evidence the court concluded "the func-
tion apparently served by the fingerprint testimony was to imply to the jury that
the prints on the razor case might have been the petitioner's."16' The court stated
that, "[h]ad the jury known that the third print on the case was not the petitioner's,
they clearly would have reached a different conclusion with respect to this evi-
dence. "16
The California Supreme Court held that even though the police investigator's
negligence had obstructed the defendant in challenging the case against him, it was
152. Misidentified Fingerprint, supra note 135, at 3.
153. Doppler Effect, supra note 135, at 10.
154. Id.
155. 298 F Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (habeas corpus petition by state prisoner); see also Doppler Effect,
supra note 135, at 10-11. The complete history of Paul Kern Imbler's case is as follows: Imbler v. Pachtman, 500
F2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974), aft'd, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
affd, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom California v. Imbler, 400 U.S. 865 (1970); In re Imbler, 393
P.2d 687 (Cal. 1964); In re Imbler, 387 P.2d 6 (Cal. 1963); People v. Imbler, 371 P.2d 304 (Cal. 1962).
156. Doppler Effect, supra note 135, at 11.
157. Imbler, 298 F Supp. at 810.
At the state habeas corpus hearing, the police fingerprint expert was reluctant to admit to the existence of
the third print . . . . When asked whether the third print could be identified, he stated that he didn't "be-
lieve so." . . . Exemplars of the petitioner's prints were then given to him during the noon recess at
which time he compared them .... His testimony about [the] second examination was somewhat eva-
sive . . . . [Wihile the state's expert was unable to make a definite statement with regard to the unmagni-
fied pictures, he was able to conclude, albeit reluctantly, that the print as it appeared in the magnified
photo was not petitioner's. After later examining the prints during an overnight recess, he finally made a








not a ground for collateral attack, and added that the razor case had been available
to petitioner during the trial.162 The federal district court disagreed. The court
concluded that the defendant's due process rights had been violated since evidence
favorable to the defendant was negligently suppressed by the prosecutor. 
163
There is little question that laboratory examinations may result in incorrect
findings. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the results of lab-
oratory tests may be contrived."1" In 1978 over two hundred crime laboratories
participated in a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration proficiency testing
program. 
165
[The program] involved such common forensic examinations such as firearms,
blood, drug, and trace evidence analyses . . . "65 percent of the laboratories had
80 percent or more of their results fall into the acceptable category. At the other end
of the spectrum, 3 percent of laboratories had less than 50 percent of their responses
considered acceptable." ... Unacceptable proficiency was most often attributed
to: (1) misinterpretation of test results due to carelessness or inexperience; (2) fail-
ure to employ adequate or appropriate methodology; (3) mislabeling or contamina-
tion of primary standards; and (4) inadequate data bases or standard spectra.
1 66
The number of crime laboratories in the United States has increased to more
than 300 since the proficiency testing program.1 67 At present, there are no national
standards ensuring the competency of laboratory examiners, although laboratories
and professional associations have their own certification or peer review pro-
grams, as well as independent proficiency testing.
1 68
IV. REMEDIES PRESENTLY AVAILABLE TO CURB EXPERT WITNESS ABUSES
A. Cross Examination
The law does little to regulate the quality of expert testimony and professional-
ism of forensic scientists. 169 "The principle safeguard against errant expert testi-
mony is the opportunity of opposing counsel to cross-examination. Generally
162. In re Imbler, 387 P.2d 6, 13 (Cal. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 908 (1964).
163. Imbler, 298 F. Supp. at 808 (citing Thomas v. United States, 343 F.2d 49, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1965)).
164. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320 (1973).
165. Proficiency testing is a method by which the accuracy of laboratory analysis is judged. See Kurt M. Du-
bowski, Drug Use Testing; Scientific Perspectives, 11 NOVA L. REV. 415, 488-93 (1987). For example, known
samples will be submitted to laboratories and they must make certain findings about the samples. Id. at 488-93.
The testing body knows the data that a proper forensic analysis of the samples would yield, and the testing body
compares that data with the laboratory's reports. Id.
166. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility ofLaboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Reliability of Scientific
Proof 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 689-90 (1988).
167. Directory of Crime Laboratories, U.S. Dept. of Justice FBI (1989).
168. Criminalist Certification Study Committee, Chicago, Ill. (July 17-18, 1988) (unpublished minutes, on
file with Miss. College Law Review). The American Board of Criminalists (ABC) has recently been created to
certify criminalists. The articles of incorporation for ABC were filed in New York in August 1989. The Ameri-
can Society of Crime Lab Directors (ASCLD) has an accreditation program for laboratories. See discussion re-
garding certification and accreditation, infra notes 205-12 and accompanying text.
169. Joseph L. Peterson & John E. Murdock, Forensic Science Ethics: Developing an Integrated System of Sup-
port and Enforcement, 34 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 749 (1989) [hereinafter Peterson & Murdock].
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opposing counsel may probe bias, partisanship, or financial interest . . . . "
However, cross-examination alone is not an adequate safeguard. "The problem is
that often the human frailty of scientific analysis can be detected and exposed only
by the trained insider. The untrained outsider . . . may confront a wall of superfi-
cial unanimity, and see no cause to inquire further."171 Most lawyers do a woefully
inadequate job in cross-examining experts. 72 One reason for this is improper
preparation. Another reason is that lawyers are reluctant to incur the risks in-
volved in challenging such an expert.173 Many lawyers do not even avail themsel-
ves of expert services and are therefore unable to effectively cross-examine
opposing experts.174 Many echo the lament of Judge Weinstein, "[h]ow can the
nonexperts control the experts?"17
The adversary process, particularly cross-examination, as the primary means
to correct or remedy negligent or erroneous expert opinions is inadequate particu-
larly in criminal cases for another reason. Since the vast majority of criminal cases
are resolved through plea bargaining, the prosecution's employment of scientific
findings is rarely challenged by the defense. The absence of a review means that
the prosecution's expert seldom has his or her credentials challenged, scientific
procedures reviewed, and results or interpretations of findings questioned by the
opposition.176
There may not be an opportunity to cross-examine the expert in a criminal case
for another reason. Recent cases have held autopsy reports and lab reports admis-
sible when the coroner or chemist is unavailable for trial.17 The cases have held
170. Sears v. Rutishauser, 466 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Ill. 1984). However, the court later refused to extend the
holding of the Sears case in Trower v. Jones, 500 N.E.2d 1134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), appeal granted, Trower v.
Jones, 508 N.E.2d 737 (11. 1987), rev'd, Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297 (Ill. 1988).
171. John M. Conley, "The First Principle of Real Reform" The Role of Science in Constitutional Jurisprudence,
65 N.C. L. REv. 935, 943 (1987).
172. Kevin M. Dowd, Book Review, 14 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 169, 171 (1988) (re-
viewing PATRICK R. ANDERSON & L. THOMAS WINFREE, JR., ExPERT WITNESSES: CRIMINOLOGISTS IN THE COURT-
ROOM (1987)).
173. James M. Doyle, Applying La wyers'Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts About Trial Court Anal-
ysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Excluding Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
619, 642 (1984) (citation omitted).
174. Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N. Y. U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 581 (1986-87). A survey of 18-B Panel attorneys (attorneys who are appointed to represent
indigent clients in New York City) showed that most did not avail themselves regularly of investigative and expert
services permitted by statute. Id. at 763. One in ten attorneys reported they had never used investigators or ex-
perts and only one in five reported they regularly used these services. Id. "Attorneys consulted with experts in
only 17 percent of all homicide cases ... [and] claimed for expert consultation in only 2 percent of all other
felonies, despite the importance of forensic evidence to the state's case." Id. at 764.
175. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 482. An expert often may lack expertise in the specific area in which he is
testifying, may base his opinion on unsupported assumptions, or may rely upon unreliable data. Id. at 481-82.
The opponent may fail to challenge these flaws, however, if he has not diligently examined the expert's testimony.
Id. Combined with the liberality of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the practice of some courts to permit jurors
to consider virtually all such testimony, the expert may appear practically unimpeachable to the jury. Id.
176. Peterson & Murdock, supra note 168, at 750.
177. Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770 (1st Cir. 1990); Washington v. Sosa, 800 P.2d 839 (Wash. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that a lab report indicating heroin was admissible under criminal rule 6.13(b) which provides a
hearsay exception for a lab report certified by the person preparing the report and provided to defendant at least
15 days prior to trial).
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the admission of such reports is not violative of the Confrontation Clause since
they possess sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and may be admitted as a
hearsay exception. 178
B. Legislation
Legislatures have proposed remedies to the problems of expert witness negli-
gence and fraud. Some state legislatures have adopted statutes which state that an
expert witness "cannot earn more than 20 percent of his total annual income from
fees for providing testimony."179 Other statutes prohibit a person from qualifying
as an expert witness regarding the standard of care in a medical malpractice action
unless at least fifty percent of the person's professional time in the two years pre-
ceding the incident is devoted to clinical practice in the same profession as the de-
fendant doctor. 180 Some legislatures have proposed capping expert witness fees. 18'
Recent legislation provides for criminal sanctions and appropriate discipline for
any person who misrepresents association with or academic standing at a post-




"Modern experimental science has built-in quality control mechanisms that en-
able scientists to determine whether they can rely on the work of other scientists
and that provide assurance that their own work can be certified as 'good' or 'reli-
able' science."83 Peer review is best understood as a process that allows the scien-
tific community to police itself.
Peer review has been heralded as one of the most effective methods for detect-
ing fraud and negligence.184 However, the efficiency of peer review in uncovering
fraud has recently been scrutinized. Recent "disclosures about fraudulent and er-
178. Manocchio, 919 F.2d at 777.
179. Booming Business, supra note 18, at 13.
180. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3412 (Supp. 1990) states:
In any medical malpractice liability action, as defined in K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 60-3401 and amendments
thereto, in which the standard of care given by a practitioner of the healing arts is at issue, no person shall
qualify as an expert witness on such issue unless at least 50% of such person's professional time within
the two-year period preceding the incident giving rise to the action is devoted to actual clinical practice in
the same profession in which the defendant is licensed.
Id.
181. See, e.g., Senate Bill 380 Fla. (1990) (proposing to cap some expert fees at $250 an hour).
182. See, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 817.566 to 817.567 (West Supp. 1991). See also OR. REV. STAT. § 348.885
(1989) (providing that misrepresentation of possession of an academic degree is fraudulent); NEv. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 205.420 (Michie 1986) (providing that the use of a false permit, license or diploma is a misdemeanor).
See also Van Tol, supra note 75.
183. Thomas S. Burack, Of Reliable Science: Scientific Peer Review, Federal Regulatory Agencies, and the
Courts, 7 VA. J. NAT. REsouRcEs L. 27, 30 (1987).
184. Woolf, supra note 80, at 81-82.
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roneous scientific papers have . . . prompted an array of proposals to make scien-
tific journals more accountable."
1 85
Responses to scientific fraud from various research institutions include forma-
tion of an internal or external investigating committee or panel; notification to
funding agencies, professional societies, and to journals in which the research was
published; letters of censure to the researcher; a requirement that the researcher
sign a statement about future conduct; dismissal of the researcher; termination;
request for resignation; press releases; news conferences; or other disclosure to
the public."18 Many agencies may suspend all funds, prohibit the individual from
obtaining funds in the future for a specified number of years, notify other funding
agencies, recommend retraction or clarification of published articles, and recover
or attempt to recover funds expended upon questionable research.187
D. Science Court
A "science court" to resolve complex scientific or technical questions has been
offered as a solution, but has made virtually no progress toward becoming a real-
ity. " The Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Ad-
vances in Sciences and Technology recommended the creation of a science
court.' 89 A panel of judges would be selected from a list of eminent scientists. The
panel and a magistrate would appoint a case manager for each party. The case
manager would present the different sides of the scientific issues.1 90 Statements of
scientific facts would be submitted by the case managers to the panel of judges. 1 '
The panel would review the statements. "Those statements not exclusively con-
cerned with questions of scientific fact would be eliminated." 92 Case managers
would examine, evaluate and possibly challenge the statements of scientific fact.
"[U]nchallenged statements would appear in the court's final report. Challenged
185. Lawrence K. Altman, Errors Prompt Proposals to Improve 'Peer Review'at Science Journals, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 1989, at C3 [hereinafter Altman].
Proposals to improve peer review call for such measures as auditing data, accounting for the length of
time it takes to review manuscripts, removing the identity of their authors and the institutions before re-
views, and abandoning the custom of anonymous reviews. These and other proposals were discussed re-
cently in Chicago at the first-ever conference to review the review process. The meeting was sponsored
by the American Medical Association . . . . Despite its importance, the peer review system is poorly
understood by most physicians and scientists. There is no standard among the thousands of journals that
apply it, and editors rarely publish their review policies . . . . In general, data to prove the value of the
peer review system are scarce . . . . [M]any articles that are initially rejected end up being published
later almost verbatim in other peer-reviewed journals.
Id.
186. Woolf, supra note 80, at 85.
187. Altman, supra note 184, at C3.
188. See Symposium, Curbing Ignorance andArrogance: The Science Court Proposal andAlternatives, 19 JURI-
METRICS J. 385 (1979); James A. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court", 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977) [herein-
after Martin]; Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal For An Institution For Scientific Judgment 156 Sci. 763 (1967).
189. Wesley, supra note 58, at 687 (citing the Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated
Advances in Science and Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 ScI. 653 (1976)).





statements would go through a mediation process "193 The final stage would
involve the production of the judges' report.'94
E. Other Solutions, Sanctions Proposed
The prescreening of experts, using court appointed experts, and adherence to
strict codes of ethics have also been proposed. 9 ' It has been suggested that every
time expert evidence is introduced through testimony, affidavit or deposition, the
court reporter should complete an information card and submit it to the American
Academy of Forensic Sciences' 96 or similar professional societies whose ethics
committees are not restricted by jurisdictional boundaries.197 This information
would be made available to any party with a legitimate interest.'98 Another solu-
tion for improving the judicial comprehension of scientific evidence is the creation
of advisory panels consisting of lay persons and scientists.'99 The use of special
masters, advisory juries, and court-appointed experts have been offered as solu-
tions.20° Judge Harold Leventhal proposed setting up a pool of scientific experts
who would act as aides to appellate judges, helping them to understand problems of
scientific methodology and assess substantive data.2"' There has even been a pro-
posal for a Judicial Office for Understanding Science and Technology.202
Some courts, frustrated with the lack of sanctions for errant behavior by expert
witnesses, have meted out sanctions. For example, in Schmidt v. Ford Motor
Co.,2"3 the plaintiffs expert witness intentionally gave misleading information in a
deposition and in informal conversations with the defendant's expert.20 4 The court
barred the plaintiffs expert from testifying in the case and prohibited him from
testifying as an expert witness in any case tried in federal court in the district.205
Efforts to improve the quality of expert witnesses have been spearheaded by the
expert witnesses themselves. Presently, eighty-four laboratories are voluntary par-
193. Id.
194. Id. at 689.
195. See, e.g., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL AND ETHICAL CONDUCT (Draft 1989).
196. The American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS) is a professional association of 3,800 members
founded in 1948 which represents the forensic specialties of Criminalist, Engineering Sciences, Jurisprudence,
Odontology, Pathology and Biology, Physical Anthropology, Psychiatry, Questioned Documents, Toxicology,
and multi-disciplinary forensic specialties.
197. See Randy Hanzlick, Discussion of "Peer Review in the Courtroom", 32 J. FORENSIC Scl. 581 (1987) (letter
to the editor and response discussing need for peer review of doctors in the courtroom) [hereinafter Hanzlick].
See also Joseph W. Davis, Peer Review in the Courtroom, 31 J. FORENSIC Scl. 803 (1986) (letter to the editor dis-
cussing need for peer review in the courtroom).
198. Hanzlick, supra note 196.
199. Wesley, supra note 58, at 693. See also Martin, supra note 187.
200. Wesley, supra note 58, at 695.
201. Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509,550
(1974).
202. Sheldon L. Trubatch, Informed Judicial Decisionmaking: A Suggestion for a Judicial Office for Understand-
ing Science and Technology, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 255, 257 (1985).
203. 112 F.R.D. 216 (D. Colo. 1986). The District Court judge also removed the plaintiffs counsel from the
case and submitted a transcript of the hearing and order to the court's Committee on Conduct. Id. at 221.
204. Id. at 220.
205. Id. at 221.
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ticipants in the American Society of Crime Lab Directors' (ASCLD) accreditation
program.2"6 ASCLD was founded in 1974.207 Its membership consists of the di-
rectors of the crime laboratories whose scientists spend the majority of their time
examining physical evidence in criminal matters.28 ASCLD requires mandatory
proficiency testing for all accredited laboratories.209
While there was initially a resistance to the certification movement more than
twelve years ago,210 it is now accepted in many areas of forensic science. Board
certification is available from certifying organizations such as The California As-
sociation of Criminalists, The International Association for Identification, The
American Board of Forensic Document Examiners, The American Board of Fo-
rensic Anthropology, The American Board of Forensic Odontology, The Ameri-
can Board of Pathology, The American Board of Forensic Psychiatry and The
American Board of Forensic Toxicology. These boards have established national
standards. Their certification programs are open to private and government foren-
sic scientists.
Another recently created certifying body is the American Board of Criminal-
ists (ABC). The ABC was incorporated in 1989."' The ABC will issue a certifi-
cate in basic criminalistics and in the disciplines of forensic biology, drug
identification, fire debris analysis, and trace evidence examination." 2 The initial
member organizations are The California Association of Criminalists (CAC),
Mid-Atlantic Association of Forensic Scientists (MAAFS), Midwestern Associa-
tion of Forensic Scientists (MAFS), Northeastern Association of Forensic Scien-
tists (NEAFS), and Southern Association of Forensic Scientists (SAFS).2" 3 Those
organizations' members voted to become members of ABC.
V. POLICY REASONS FOR AND AGAINST EXPERT WITNESS
MALPRACTICE CAUSE OF ACTION
One means of addressing the problem of expert witness malpractice is to pro-
vide harmed parties with a cause of action. This idea finds both support and oppo-
sition in policy and practicality.
Malpractice is defined as:
The failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and
learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the av-
erage prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss or
damage to the recipient of those services or to those entitled to rely upon them.
21 4
206. Telephone interview with Richard Tanton, Immediate Past President of ASCLD (October 15, 1991).
207. American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, Inc., Informational Brochure (undated).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Jan Bashinski, Laboratory Standards: Accreditation, Training and Certification of Staff in Forensic Con-
text, in BANBURY REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE (J. Ballantyne et al. eds., 1989).
211. AMERICAN BOARD OF CRIMINAUSTICS CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (Draft 1991).
212. Id. at3.
213. Id. at 13.
214. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990). KEETON, supra note 9, § 32, at 185-86.
[Vol. 12:39
EXPERT WITNESS MALPRACTICE
The misconduct of expert witnesses seems to fall within this definition since ex-
perts have gained stature as professionals and should be responsible and non-neg-
ligent. The expert witness' importance to the legal community justifies the
imposition of malpractice liability. The special relationships of trust and reliance
that exist between the experts, clients, defendants, attorneys, judges and jurors re-
quire imposition of the malpractice cause of action. Since the injuries and dam-
ages rising from the malpractice of expert witnesses are real and substantial, the
law should provide a remedy.
Another reason for permitting malpractice actions is to assure "quality control"
of expert opinions - "a way to find out whether something unhealthy is happening,
and to correct it."21s Since non-experts are not competent to assess an expert's
competence and diligence, the principle of caveat emptor 18 breaks down. The
market cannot alert persons to those experts who are incompetent or careless. 17
"The court, then, serves as a substitute for the marketplace, imposing financial
penalties . "... 28
One of the impediments to expert witness malpractice actions is that some
courts hold that the expert witness who gives opinion evidence is the court's wit-
ness and whether sued by a party or by a non-party enjoys immunity against all
post-trial damage claims.219 However, the witness immunity rule is traditionally
limited to defamation cases22 and is extremely narrow in scope. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts defines the parameters of the privilege as follows: "A witness is
absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in commu-
nications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding or as part of ajudicial pro-
ceeding in which he is testifying, if it has some relation to the proceeding."22 The
privilege is clearly limited to the publication of defamatory matter. It does not offer
a wholesale immunity for any civil wrong. The traditional witness immunity rule
should not apply to shield negligent expert witnesses who are influential in deter-
mining the jury's verdict, as it would corrupt the integrity of the jury system which
depends upon the full and accurate development of all evidence and facts.
Protecting expert witnesses from liability for statements made in court furthers
this goal. However, the full and accurate development of evidence is not served by
protecting negligent or false trial testimony. Rather, the expert should be held to
the standard of care within his profession. Moreover, the traditional witness im-
munity rule should not shield expert witnesses since it is the expert witness' acts
and opinions reached outside of court which form the basis for the claim for expert
215. Bennett, supra note 108, at 31.
216. Latin term literally meaning, "let the buyer beware."
217. Bennett, supra note 108, at 31.
218. Id.
219. Bader v. State, 716 P.2d 925 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Bailey v. Rogers, 631 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982). See also Clark v. Grigson, 579 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
220. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Ackerman, 124 A.2d 313 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (holding that remarks
of a witness, although not concise, were relevant to the main issue, and thus were absolutely privileged).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 (1977).
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witness malpractice. The negligence that occurred in the course of the investiga-
tion and analysis merely continues during the course of providing testimony or by
virtue of the testimony itself.
A policy reason for providing immunity to expert witnesses is to avoid the har-
assment by unfounded litigation which would cause a deflection of the expert's en-
ergies from public duties and the possibility that he or she would shade decisions
rather than exercising independent judgment. There is some concern that lawsuits
against expert witnesses may also restrict the use of new scientific evidence.222
There is also some concern about whether such a cause of action will have a
chilling effect on the willingness of persons to serve as forensic experts in the liti-
gation process. Possibly there will be a dwindling number of experts or even in-
creased charges for such services. However, this is not such a compelling public
policy concern to justify not recognizing an expert witness malpractice cause of
action. Indeed, such a result did not occur when the causes of action for account-
ant's malpractice, medical malpractice and legal malpractice arose.
VI. EXPERT WITNESS MALPRACTICE CASELAW
Presently, there is very little authority that addresses whether and on what legal
basis, victims of expert witness negligence may seek redress against the negligent
witness. Some authority allows expert witnesses immunity from suit. 2 3 Other au-
thority allows negligence actions to proceed. 4 The majority of courts that have
decided cases involving negligence by experts have shielded the experts from civil
liability. The courts rejected expert witness malpractice claims on two theories:
(1) negligent mistakes or inaccuracies do not constitute perjury; and (2) testimony
and reports provided to courts are privileged, thus experts who give negligently
erroneous testimony are shielded from civil suit. 5 A few courts, though, have
held that experts may be liable for their negligence.
In Levine v. Wiss & Co. ,26 the court held that a court appointed accountant in a
contested divorce case may be held liable for negligent preparation justifiably re-
lied upon by the litigants.27 The court also held that the liability can be "the basis
for recovery of damages for economic loss or injury sustained as a consequence of
that reliance." 2 The court rejected the defendant's limited privilege argument and
held that an expert who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profes-
sional trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by
222. See Michael J. Saks, Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science, 34 J. FORENSIC SCi.
772 (1989), for a summary of cases involving litigation against expert witnesses.
223. See infra note 241.
224. See infra note 225-37.
225. Id.
226. 478 A.2d 397 (N.J. 1984).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 399 (citation omitted).
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members of that profession in good standing in similar communities."' The court
stated:
[Immunity] should not be available to shield from liability for negligence appraisers
or other experts performing limited functions, as part of their regular professional
responsibilities, in the context of judicial proceedings. To do so would . . . create
an additional legal immunity-a consequence contrary to our prevailing philosophy
and practice that strive to provide redress for wrongful injury.230
As such, the expert witness could be held liable for damages for economic loss as a
result of the breach of his duty. In Wolpert v. North Shore University Hospital,231 the
court in dicta noted that if the reports issued by a physician, psychologists and a
social worker concerning the alleged sexual abuse by plaintiffs of their grandson
were inaccurate and negligently, recklessly or intentionally rendered, they would
generate the same responsibility as the accountant's report in Levine v. Wiss &
Co. 232
In James v. Brown,233 the plaintiff sued three psychiatrists who had filed reports
with the court on the issue of the soundness of her mind or her need for involun-
tary hospitalization.234 Based upon these reports she was hospitalized.235 She later
sued for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, defamation and negli-
gence. 236 The Texas Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the false imprisonment
and malicious prosecution actions for failure to state a claim. 237 The dismissal of
the defamation action was affirmed under the doctrine of absolute privilege.2 8 As
to the negligence claim for malpractice, the court reversed and remanded for trial
holding that the diagnoses themselves may be actionable on other grounds. 2 9 The
plaintiff was "not prevented from recovering from the doctors for negligent misdi-
agnosis-medical malpractice merely because their diagnoses were later communi-
cated to a court in the due course of judicial proceedings."24 °
In James, the Texas Supreme Court disapproved of the Texas Court of Appeals'
decision in Clark v. Grigson, 241 which provided a psychiatrist testifying in mental
health proceedings with blanket immunity from all civil liability. 242 The James de-
cision supports the view that where the underlying negligent act is the basis of the
claim, conduct is not cloaked with immunity simply because the results of the in-
229. Id.
230. Id. at 401-02 (citation omitted).
231. 555 A.2d 729 (N.J. Super A.D. 1989).
232. Id. at 730 n. 1.
233. 637 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1982). -
234. Id.





240. Id. at 918.
241. 579 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
242. 637 S.W.2d at 917.
1991]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
vestigation and assessment are published in some fashion in judicial proceedings.
If mere publication transforms culpable conduct into immunized conduct, this
could lead to unreasonable results. 243
A relatively recent case which squarely addresses the issue of an expert's negli-
gence is from the Supreme Court of Washington. In Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & As-
soc. Engineers, Inc. ,2 the court held in a five to four decision, that an engineer
who testified as an expert witness for the plaintiffs at trial was entitled to immunity
from suit based on his testimony.24 The appellees Robert and Sallee Bruce and
Mildred Smallwood, owned separate parcels of land on Clear Lake. In 1979, their
neighbor conducted excavation work which resulted in the loss of lateral support in
the soil of their properties.246 They sued the neighbor and hired an engineering
firm to calculate the cost of stabilizing their land.247 Byrne, the engineer testified
at trial "that the cost of restoring lateral support would be $10,020 on the Bruce
property and $11,020 on the Smallwood property."2 The trial court found
against the neighbor for damages in those respective amounts.24 When the cost
later proved to be twice the amount of Byrne's estimate, Bruce and Smallwood
sued Byrne and the engineering firm. 2 0 They alleged "Byrne was negligent in pre-
paring his analysis and testimony and that, but for Byrne's low estimate of the cost
of restoring lateral support, they would have obtained judgment against [the
neighbor] for the true cost of the restoration."2 1
The Washington Supreme Court held that Byrne was entitled to immunity from
suit based upon his testimony.252 The purpose of the immunity rule is for parties
and witnesses to preserve the integrity of the judicial process by encouraging full
and frank testimony.253 The court explained that a witness' apprehension of subse-
quent liability might cause a witness to be reluctant to testify and possibly to distort
his testimony if he takes the stand. 254 The court was concerned that "[a] witness
who knows that he might be forced to defend a subsequent lawsuit, and perhaps to
pay damages, might be inclined to shade his testimony" in favor of the potential
plaintiff and thus deprive the "finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted
evidence."2 5 The court was concerned that "imposing civil liability on expert wit-
nesses would discourage anyone who is not a full-time professional expert witness
243. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association at 10, Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens &
Assoc. Engineers, Inc., 776 P.2d 666 (1989) (No. 55250-9).







251. Id. at 666-67.
252. Id. at 667.
253. Id.
254. Id. (quoting Briscoe v. Latue, 460 U.S. 325, 332-33 (1983).
255. Id.
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from testifying. Only professional witnesses will be in a position to carry insur-
ance to guard against such liability."" 6
The court conceded that there is some merit to the contention "that the threat of
liability would encourage experts to be more careful, resulting in more accurate,
reliable testimony." '257 However, the court felt that the threat of losses in objectivity
would outweigh the possible gains.2"' The court reasoned that the safeguards of
"the oath, the hazard of cross-examination and the threat of prosecution for per-
jury" were enough to ensure a witness' reliability.
2 59
Three arguments were made by the respondents and amicus curiae on behalf of
the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association in support of the nonapplicability
of the general rule of witness immunity to this case: "The expert is retained and
compensated by a party for his testimony; witness immunity is limited to defama-
tion cases; and, witness immunity is limited to statements made at trial."26 The
court decided that none of the arguments had merit.261 The court stated that "[tihe
purpose of granting immunity to participants in judicial proceedings is to preserve
and enhance the judicial process. 262 The court stated that expert witnesses' partic-
ipation in bringing litigation to a conclusion is as indispensable as prosecutors' and
judges' participation, therefore experts should also be immune from suit. 263 The
court did not distinguish between retained experts and court appointed experts and
stated "as a matter of law the expert serves the court."264
The court dismissed the argument that witness immunity was only meant to
protect against defamation. The court discussed the James v. Brown265 decision.
The Washington Supreme Court found no reason to follow the Texas Court's hold-
ing in James since it was "contrary to the majority rule. 266 The court also pointed
out that "James turns on a specific Texas statute which preempted the common law
rule of immunity." 267 Thus, the Washington Court distinguished James from the
Bruce case since Washington has no such statute.
The court reasoned that "witness immunity must extend to the basis of the wit-
ness' testimony, or the policies underlying such immunity would be undermined
.. . [since] [t~here is no way to distinguish the testimony from the acts and com-
256. Id. at 670. The court's fear was not well founded. There are many insurance plans available at a nominal
fee to those who provide expert testimony, whether on a full or part-time basis. An example is the insurance pol-
icy available through the National Forensic Center, Princeton, N.J.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 667.
260. Id. at 668.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 669 (citations omitted).
264. Id.
265. 637 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1982).
266. Bruce, 776 P.2d at 671.
267. Id. at 671 (citing TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-18 (Vernon Supp. 1989), which "grants immunity
to persons who without negligence perform examinations and other acts required by the Texas mental health
code").
1991l
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
munications on which it is based."268 Thus, the court held that "absolute immunity
extends to acts and statements of experts which arise in the course of or prelimi-
nary to judicial proceedings."" 9 Since "[the engineering firm] was hired specifi-
cally for litigation purposes" the court held it was entitled to absolute immunity.27
Justice Pearson, in a strongly worded dissent, stated that the majority miscon-
strued the issue in the case:
The question in this case is not whether an expert witness is immune from subse-
quent suit for defamatory statements made in a court of law. That question is well
settled. Rather, [it is] whether a professional's act of malpractice outside the court-
room is somehow immunized by the subsequent articulation of that negligently
formed opinion in a judicial proceeding. 71
According to Justice Pearson, "[n]either the law of absolute immunity nor sound
public policy dictates the result reached by the majority."272 "[T]he majority ex-
tends the immunity rule to shield otherwise actionable professional malprac-
tice. '  "[B]oth the law and common sense do not support such a judicially
created rule."274 The dissenting justices would hold that "the doctrine of absolute
immunity does not bar the client's action against his or her own expert for a negli-
gently rendered professional opinion."275
VII. ELEMENTS OF EXPERT WITNESS MALPRACTICE
Malpractice is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the
failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and
learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the av-
erage, prudent, reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, or loss
or damage to the recipient of those services or to those entitled to rely upon them.276
The traditional elements of the negligence action for malpractice are: (1) the exist-
ence of a duty owed to the plaintiff arising out of the relationship between the de-
fendant and the plaintiff; (2) a negligent act or omission by the defendant in breach
of that duty; (3) causation, i.e., but for the defendant's negligence the plaintiff
would not have been damaged; and (4) damages.277
268. Id. at 672.
269.Id. at 673.
270. Id.




275. Id. at 676.
276. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990).




A. Duties Owed By Expert Witnesses
The factors to consider in determining whether to impose a duty of care include
the closeness of the causal connection between the expert's conduct to the injury
suffered, and the foreseeability of the particular harm to the injured party.27 The
expert witness may have a duty to the party who hired him or to a third party if he
is the party most likely to suffer damage due to a negligently rendered decision.
Arguably, the expert also owes a duty to the court and the attorneys. Standards of
care are established for the well-known areas of forensic sciences. 279 Emerging ar-
eas may need to look to other criteria for determining the standard of care.
Forensic science tends to follow trends in the medical field. There is a growing
trend in tort litigation toward allowing discovery and admission at trial of code
standards and policies because such material can provide evidence of the defend-
ant's standard of care.28 Most of the forensic experts' professional associations
have ethical codes which could be used as standards.281
Professional ethical or conduct standards currently enter malpractice litigation at the
expert testimony stage: By defining the prevailing practices, which are inculcated
through the codes, and by discussing whether or not those practices have been fol-
lowed in a given case, the expert is both telling the court and jury what the current
ethical expectations involve, and informing them about specific procedures and de-
velopments.282
Professional liability carriers are even offering premium reductions for physi-
cians who agreed to be bound by practice standards .283 The American Society of
Anesthesiologists was the first specialty society to set standards in 1986 and they
added to those standards in 1988 .2' The American College of Cardiology, Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American College of Radiology
and American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons worked in 1988 to refine the
278. See Nally v. Grace Community Church, 763 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007
(1989).
279. See, e.g., R.L. Brunelle & A.A. Cantu, Training Requirements and Ethical Responsibilities of Forensic
Scientists Performing Ink Dating Examinations, 32 J. FORENSIC Sci. 1502 (1987) (brief letter to the editor with
enclosed training and ethical guidelines).
280. See Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Admissibility in Evidence, On Issue ofNegligence, of Codes or Standards of
Safety Issued or Sponsored by Governmental Body orBy Voluntary Association, 58 A.L.R. 3d 148 (1974); Robert
Lind & Alan Ullberg, Are Professional Codes of Ethics Acquiring the Force ofLaw, 11 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERI-
ALS J. 63 (1987). Note that the preamble of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
states that: "Violation of a rule does not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that
illegal duty has been breached . . . they are not designed to be a basis for civil liability." MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDucr Preamble (1983).
281. See, e.g., CAL. ASS'N OF CRMINALISTS: CODE OF ETHICS (Revised May 17, 1985). The National Acad-
emy of Sciences issued a 22-page publication on laboratory ethics for young scientists. It is designed to guide
graduate students in the ethical conduct of scientific research and addresses issues as data-reporting accuracy.
See also 3 CORP. CRIME RaP. 13 (1989).
282. Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53 FORDHAm L. RE-
viEw 449, 486-87 (1984).
283. Rebecca Voelker, Leveling Trend in Premium Rates Seen Continuing, AM. MED. NEwS, Jan. 13, 1989, at
17, 19.
284. See also Standards for Patient Monitoring Daring Anesthesia at Harvard Medical School, 8 J. A. MED.
ASS'N 256 (1986).
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practice guidelines for their members.285 The American Medical Association is
establishing parameters for various types of medical care.286
B. Causation
A crucial element of the tort of malpractice is causation. The imposition of tort
liability has always required proof that the defendant caused the plaintiffs injury.
Causation tests whether the defendant's actions were in fact connected by physical
events to the plaintiffs injury. Proximate cause concerns whether the connection
was close enough to allow compensation to the injured party.287 As stated by the
past President of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, "[t]he impact of
the forensic scientist's conclusions affords no room for error, because such error
may be the direct cause of an injustice."288 Liability and damages on the one hand,
or, conviction and incarceration on the other, are a reasonable and foreseeable
consequence of an expert witness' negligent testimony.
Admittedly, it may be difficult to establish a causal link between the defendant
and the negligent expert testimony if more than one expert testifies, or there is a
great deal of other evidence in the case. However, special verdict forms, as are
used in civil cases and some criminal cases,289 could be used to identify which ex-
pert's testimony was relied upon in the jurors' decision making without inquiring
impermissibly into the deliberation process. In some cases it may be readily ap-
parent that the expert testimony alone "caused" the verdict, especially in light of




286. Paul Marcotte, MD Guidelines - AMA Mulls Standards of Care, 75 A.B.A. J. 28 (1989).
287. KEETON, supra note 9, § 4 1, at 264. "[Llegal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so
closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability." Id.
288. Richard S. Frank, The Essential Commitment For a Forensic Scientist, 32 J. FORENSIC Sci. 5 (1987) (guest
editorial). See also supra notes 135-52 and accompanying text regarding the Caldwell case where the court char-
acterized the fingerprint expert's testimony as "damning." State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Minn.
1982).
289. Generally, special verdicts in criminal cases are not favored. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165,
180-83 (1 st Cir. 1969). However, there is no per se rule that such verdicts are absolutely forbidden. See Heald v.
Mullaney, 505 F.2d 1241, 1245 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975).
"Most criticism of special verdicts in criminal cases is based on the danger that such verdicts might be devices
for bringing judicial pressure to bear on juries in reaching their verdicts." United States v. O'Looney, 544 F2d
385, 392 (9th Cir. 1976).
To ask the jury special questions might be said to infringe on its power to deliberate free from legal fetters;
on its power to arrive at a general verdict without having to support it by reasons or by a report of its
deliberations; and on its power to follow or not to follow the instructions of the court. Moreover any
abridgement or modification of this institution would partly restrict its historic function, that of temper-
ing rules of law by common sense brought to bear upon the facts of a specific case.
Id. (citation omitted).
Some state statutes provide that verdicts in criminal cases must be general. See TIx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art.
37.07(l)(a) (West 1991). See New Jersey v. Simon, 398 A.2d 861, 866-67 (N.J. 1979), for an extensive discus-
sion of the caselaw regarding special verdicts and special interrogatories.
290. See supra notes 41,44-47 and accompanying text.
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C. Damages
An expert witness found liable for negligence will be liable in damages for the
full extent of the identifiable loss. Experts will typically be held liable for all inju-
ries proximately caused by or foreseeably arising from their breach of duty. In a
criminal case, incarceration of a defendant is a reasonable and foreseeable conse-
quence of an expert witness' incompetent opinion. Admittedly, damages in crimi-
nal cases would be more difficult to assess than in civil matters as estimating the
value of a client's loss of liberty because of a criminal conviction caused by the
expert's breach of duty is speculative. Experts concede "[t]here is no monetary
measure for the damage done by false conviction of an innocent man, even though
only a minor crime may be involved."291 In view of the stigma and fear one experi-
ences upon incarceration, damages should not be limited merely to economic loss.
Limiting plaintiffs recovery to purely economic loss would not further the goal of
deterring wrongful expert witness misconduct nor would a plaintiff be left with
fair compensation in the face of wrongdoing.
There have been cases where courts awarded plaintiffs a certain amount per
month for illegal confinement due to legal malpractice.292 Recently, a state appeals
court in California upheld a $400,000 damage award for legal malpractice.293 The
court upheld the plaintiffs recovery for actual damages and for emotional distress
as a result of his incarceration for the involuntary manslaughter of his wife.294 The
court held that the stigma of being convicted and the fear the plaintiff experienced
upon incarceration was sufficient evidence of damages.29 Some states may have
recovery limits for tort actions296 which would affect damage awards, since many
expert witnesses are state employees.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Scientific evidence promises great benefits when used properly. Used improp-
erly, it threatens not only individual cases, but potentially the entire justice sys-
291. See Ordway Hilton, Ethics and the Document Examiner Under the Adversary System, 21 J. FORENSIC Sc.
779,781 (1976).
292. See, e.g., Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.) (emotional damages awarded when counsel
negligently withdrew from case), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982); Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F Supp. 91 (D.N.J.
1988); Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (the Louisiana Appellate
Court awarded $1500 per month for eight months for the defendant's incarceration due to counsel's negligence).
293. Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
294. Id. at 449.
295. Id. at 454 n.5. One of the plaintiffs cell-mates was nicknamed "Monster" "for apparently good reasons,"
and another cell-mate was a paranoid schizophrenic. Id.
296. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(5) (West 1990) which states:
[T]he state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual . . . but liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for the
period before judgment. Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivision shall be liable to pay a claim or a
judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of $100,000 or any claim orjudgment, or portions
thereof which, when totaled with all other claims or judgments paid by the state or its agencies or subdivi-
sions arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the sum of $200,000.
The same statute states that a judgment may be "rendered in excess of these amounts . . . and that portion of the
judgment that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Legislature, but may be paid in part or in whole only
by further act of the Legislature." Id.
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tem.297 Expert witnesses owe their clients certain duties relating to their
professional knowledge and skill similar to those owed clients by other profession-
als: doctors, engineers, accountants, architects, and attorneys.
The law does little to regulate the quality of expert testimony per se. Courts
have held that the principal safeguard against errant expert testimony is the oppor-
tunity for opposing counsel to cross examine. However, cross examination is not
an adequate safeguard. Trial lawyers are usually reluctant to incur the risks in-
volved in challenging an expert. Many lawyers do not even avail themselves of ex-
pert services; therefore they do not have the knowledge to effectively
cross-examine opposing experts.
Solutions offered to curb expert abuses include: capping expert witness fees;
pre-screening experts; using only court appointed experts; adherence to a strict
code of ethics; peer review; and a science court. To date, these existing remedies
for controlling expert witness negligence have proven inadequate and/or unworka-
ble. Thus, it is logical to pursue a malpractice cause of action since experts have
gained stature as professionals and should be accountable for their negligence. The
expert witness's importance to the legal community justifies the imposition of
malpractice liability. Since the injuries and damages arising from the malpractice
of expert witnesses are genuine, the law is obligated to provide a remedy. A cause
of action based on expert witness malpractice will ensure that experts are account-
able for their opinions and will protect and compensate individuals who are dam-
aged by their negligence.
297. Fredrick I. Lederer, Scientific Evidence-An Introduction, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 517, 518 (1984).
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